The recent financial crisis has raised several questions with respect to the corporate governance of financial institutions. This paper investigates whether risk management-related corporate governance mechanisms, such as for example the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO) in a bank"s executive board and whether the CRO reports to the CEO or directly to the board of directors, is associated with a better bank performance during the financial crisis of 2007/2008. We measure bank performance by buy-and-hold returns, ROA, and ROE and we control for standard corporate governance variables such as CEO ownership, board size, and board independence. Most importantly, our results indicate that banks, in which the CRO directly reports to the board of directors and not to the CEO (or other corporate entities), exhibit significantly higher (i.e., less negative) stock returns, ROA, and ROE during the crisis. In contrast, standard corporate governance variables are mostly insignificantly or even negatively related to the banks" performance during the crisis.
Introduction
This paper investigates whether the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO) in the executive board of a bank and other risk management-related corporate governance mechanisms (which are also termed "risk governance") positively affect bank performance during the recent financial crisis. The paper combines and further develops relevant previous findings from three major areas of research: corporate governance, enterprise risk management (ERM), and bank performance.
Whereas scandals such as Enron and Worldcom gave primarily rise to new developments in accounting practices, the financial crisis following the subprime meltdown in the U.S. has led to a further growing awareness and need for appropriate risk management techniques and structures within financial organizations. 1 In quantitative risk management, the focus lies on how to improve the measurement and management of specific risks such as liquidity risk, credit risk, and market risk. On a structural level, the issue of how to integrate these risks into one single message to senior executives is being addressed. Earlier literature on risk management focused on single types of risk while missing out on the interdependence to other risks (Miller, 1992) . Consequently, only in the 1990"s, the academic literature started to focus on an integrated view of risk management (e.g., Cumming and Mirtle, 2001; Miccolis and Shaw, 2000; Miller, 1992; Nocco and Stulz, 2006; Sabato, 2010) .
In addition, public policy makers around the world have started to question the appropriateness of the current corporate governance applied to financial institutions. In particular the role and the profile of risk management in financial institutions has been put under scrutiny. In many recent policy documents, comprehensive risk management frameworks are outlined in combination with recommended governance structures (e.g., BIS, 2008; FSA, 2008; IIF, 2007; Walker, 2009) . One common recommendation is to "put risk high on the agenda" by creating respective structures. This can involve many different actions. As already claimed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, financial expertise is considered to play an important role. Other, more specific measures involve either the creation of a dedicated risk committee or designating a CRO who over-1 There are also recent academic studies which emphasize that flaws in bank governance played an important role in the poor performance of banks during the financial crisis of (e.g., Diamond and Rajan, 2009 . Also a recent OECD report concludes that the financial crisis can be to an important extent attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements (Kirkpatrick, 2009). sees all relevant risks within the institution (e.g., Brancato, Tonello, Hexter, and Newman, 2006; Sabato, 2010) . Mongiardino and Plath (2010) show that the risk governance in large banks seems to have improved only to a limited extent despite increased regulatory pressure induced by the credit crisis. They outline best practices in banking risk governance and highlight the need to have at least (1) a dedicated board-level risk committee, of which (2) a majority should be independent, and (3) that the CRO should be part of the bank"s executive board. By surveying 20 large banks, however, they find only a small number of banks to follow best practices in 2007. Even though most large banks had a dedicated risk committee, most of them met very infrequently. Also, most risk committees were not comprised of enough independent and financially knowledgeable members (see also Hau and Thum, 2010) . And most of those large banks had a CRO but its position and reporting line did not ensure an appropriate level of accessibility and thus influence on the CEO and the board of directors. The results of Hashagen, Harman, Conover, and Sharma (2009) , which are based on a large survey among 500 senior managers involved in the risk management at leading banks around the world, confirm the finding of suboptimal risk governance structures in the majority of banks: 76% of the interviewed risk managers feel that the risk function is still being stigmatized as a support function and 45% believe that their organization lacks experience in risk management at the board level.
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Whereas the role and importance of the CRO, and risk governance more generally, in the banking industry has been highlighted in the newspapers (see Figure 1 ), in various reports (Brancato, Tonello, Hexter, and Newman, 2006) , as well as in practitioneroriented studies (e.g., Banham, 2000) , it has not been analyzed in the academic literature so far. Some other aspects of corporate governance in banks, such as board characteristics and CEO pay structure, have been addressed in recent academic studies (e.g., Beltratti and Stulz, 2010; Erkens, Hung, and Matos, 2010; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011) . However, the literature on corporate governance and the valuation effect of corporate governance in financial firms is still very limited. Financial institutions do have their particularities, such as higher opaqueness, heavy regulation and intervention by the government (Levine, 2004) , which require a distinct analysis of corporate governance issues. Consist-ently, Adams and Mehran (2003) and Macey and O"Hara (2003) highlight the importance of taking differences in governance between banking and non-banking firms into consideration.
In this paper, we argue that one important difference between financial and nonfinancial firms, that has to be taken into account, is the role of risk management in the governance structure of financial firms. While the importance of risk management has been recognized, the actual role of risk management in a corporate governance context still lacks common interpretation. Most banks still seem to consider asset growth and a reduction of operational costs as the main drivers of profitability. Risk management has often the role of a support/control function. However, the last financial crisis has clearly demonstrated that the business of banks is risk, therefore the legitimate question arises whether the CRO should not hold a more important and powerful role within banks. As
Warren Buffet stated in his 2008 letter to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., his belief is "that the CEO of any large financial organization must be the Chief Risk
Officer as well". The consequence in the end would be a governance system contrary to the one prevailing today, with the executive officers reporting to the CRO and not the other way round.
The two recent studies by Beltratti and Stulz (2010) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) analyze the influence of corporate governance on bank performance during the credit crisis. However, both studies rely on variables that have been used in the literature to analyze the relation between corporate governance and firm value of non-financial institutions. Specifically, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) analyze the influence of CEO incentives and share ownership on bank performance and find no evidence for a better performance of banks in which the incentives provided by the CEO"s pay package are stronger (i.e., the fraction of equity-based compensation is higher). In fact, their evidence rather points to banks providing stronger incentives to CEOs performing worse in the crisis. A possible explanation for this finding is that CEOs may have focused on the interests of shareholders in the build-up to the crisis and took actions that they believed the market would welcome. Ex post, however, these actions were costly to their banks and their shareholders when the results turned out to be poor. Beltratti and Stulz (2010) investigate the relation between corporate governance and bank performance during the credit crisis in an international sample of 98 banks.
Most importantly, they find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards as measured by the "Corporate Governance Quotient" (CGQ) obtained from RiskMetrics performed worse during the crisis, which indicates that the generally shared understanding of "good governance" does not necessarily have to be in the best interest of shareholders. Beltratti and Stulz (2010) argue that "banks that were pushed by their boards to maximize shareholder wealth before the crisis took risks that were understood to create shareholder wealth, but were costly ex post because of outcomes that were not expected when the risks were taken" (p. 3). In addition, they find that financial variables such as the tier 1 capital ratio, deposits as a percentage of total assets, and bank profitability are more important determinants of bank performance during the crisis than are governance and regulation.
Similar to Beltratti and Stulz (2010) , Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2010) investigate the relation between corporate governance and the performance of financial firms during credit crisis of 2007/2008. Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2010) use an international sample of 296 financial firms from 30 countries. Consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2010) , they find that firms with more independent boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock returns during the crisis. They argue that firms with higher institutional ownership took more risk prior to the crisis which resulted in larger shareholder losses during the crisis period. Moreover, firms with more independent boards raised more equity capital during the crisis, which led to a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to debtholders.
In this paper, we aim at extending the literature by analyzing the influence of bankspecific corporate governance, and in particular "risk governance" characteristics on the performance of banks during the financial crisis. The measures of risk governance that we use are the following: a dummy variable whether the CRO is a member of the executive board, whether the CRO directly reports to the board of directors, whether the CRO reports to the CEO, the percentage of directors on the board with a finance background, whether there is a dedicated risk committee, the number of meetings of such a risk committee, and the percentage of independent directors in the risk committee. All these variables are hand-collected from 10k (annual report) and Def 14A (Proxy Statement) forms in the SEC"s EDGAR Database for a sample of 372 U.S. banks in 2006. In addition, we control for standard corporate governance variables used in previous studies on corporate governance in non-banks (e.g., Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; Hoechle, Schmid, Walter, and Yermack, 2010) and in Beltratti and Stulz (2010) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) for banks. Examples are board size, board independence, whether the CEO is also chairman of the board, board busyness, institutional ownership, CEO ownership, and the corporate governance index based on takeover provisions as proposed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) . This additional corporate governance data is obtained from the
RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) Directors and Governance databases, from Standard and
Poor"s ExecuComp database, and from Thomson Financial"s CDA/Spectrum database.
Hence, this paper extends current research on corporate governance in banks by both broadening the perspective on corporate governance and bank performance, as well as deepening the understanding of the role of risk management in a banking context.
As in Beltratti and Stulz (2010) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) , we collect our measures of corporate governance for 2006, the last complete year before the financial crisis. We then investigate whether corporate governance at the end of the year 2006 is significantly related to the banks" stock returns, ROA, and ROE during the crisis period.
Following Beltratti and Stulz (2010) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) , we define the crisis period to last from July 1, 2007 , to December 31, 2008 . Depending on the regression setup and, in particular, the corporate governance mechanisms included, our regressions include between 54 and 372 observations. Our results provide robust evidence that banks in which the CRO reports directly to the board of directors perform significantly better in the credit crisis while banks in which the CRO reports to the CEO perform significantly worse than other banks in our sample. This result confirms our hypothesis that the typical corporate governance structure with all executive board members reporting to the CEO is not the most appropriate for banking organizations. A possible explanation for this finding may be that CEOs" main interest is to maximize growth in sales, assets, and profits -possibly both in the shareholders" as well as his own interest as growth helps to maximize the value of the personal remuneration package as well as prestige and power (e.g., managerial empire building Yermack, 1996) or board independence. Hence, our results on the "standard" corporate governance mechanisms are largely consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2010) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) . There results are consistent with the view that banks were pushed by their boards to maximize shareholder wealth before the crisis and thereby took risks that were understood to create wealth but later turned out poorly in the credit crisis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample and the variables. Section 3 reports the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
Data and Variables

Sample selection
As in Beltratti and Stulz (2010) This leaves us with a sample of 573 banks.
In a next step, we hand-collect corporate governance data from the banks" 10k (annual report) and Def 14A (proxy statement) forms in the SEC"s EDGAR Database. We collect data on whether the CRO is a member of the executive board, the existence of a board risk committee, board size, board independence, and the (finance) background of board members. The availability (i.e., reporting) of these variables further reduces our sample size to 372 banks which constitute the larger set of banks we use in our empirical analyses of Section 3. As we restrict our sample to banks included in the COMPUSTAT Bank North America database, all banks in our sample are either primarily commercial banks (SIC code 6020) or savings institutions (SIC codes 6035 and 6036). Finally, we hand-collect another five corporate/risk governance variables, which provide more detailed information on the risk committee and on the line of reporting of the CRO, from the companies" annual filings. As all these variables have to be handcollected from the banks" annual reports in a time-consuming way, we restrict the sample to the 86 banks with data available on the corporate governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) , as obtained from the IRRC Governance Legacy database. The resulting sample size then ranges from 54 to 85 observations as one bank does not provide sufficient information regarding its risk committee and the line of reporting of the CRO in its annual report to be included in our sample. 
Measures of bank performance
We use three alternative measures of bank performance. Following Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and Beltratti and Stulz (2010) , our first measure of bank performance are the banks" buy-and-hold returns over the time period July 1, 2007 , to December 31, 2008 . We use monthly holding period returns from CRSP to compute cumulative buy-and-hold returns.
Alternatively, in unreported robustness tests, we use alphas from a Carhart (1997) 4-factor model instead of raw returns. The alphas are estimated as the intercept of the following time-series regression which is estimated at the bank level:
where R t is the excess return to the respective bank"s stock in month t, RMRF t is the month t value-weighted market return minus the risk-free rate, and SMB t (small minus big), HML t (high minus low), and MOM t are the month t returns on zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios designed to capture size, book-to-market, and momentum effects, respectively. It is important to note that collecting data on all 372 banks with data available on the first five corporate governance mechanisms (i.e., whether the CRO is a member of the executive board, the existence of a board risk committee, board size, board independence, and the (finance) background of board members) would not substantially increase sample size as the vast majority of the smaller banks do not report the necessary information in their annual report (e.g., on the line of reporting of the CRO). 7 For details on the construction of the factors, see Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) . We obtained the data on all four risk factors from Kenneth French"s website at: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 8 The results based on all these alternative return-based measures of bank performance are similar and therefore we only report results based on the 18-month buy-and-hold returns, as used in both Beltratti and Stulz (2010) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) , for space reasons.
As alternative measures of bank performance, we use two measures of bank profitability during the crisis. The first profitability measure we use is return on assets (ROA), 
Corporate governance variables
Due to limited availability of governance data on banks as well as the neglect of risk management-specific governance data on commercial governance databases, such as for example IRRC / RiskMetrics, we hand-collect most of our corporate governance variables from the companies" 10k filings, proxy statements, and from company websites.
For the first group of five hand-collected corporate governance variables, we target all 372 banks for which the 2006 annual report and 2007 proxy statement are available.
The first variable we collect data on is a dummy variable whether the CRO is a member of the executive board (CRO in executive board). If the CRO is a member of the executive board, his influence and power are expected to be larger as compared to a CRO who is situated on the third management level. 49 of the 372 banks report that the CRO is a member of the executive board. 10 It is important to note that a strong CRO is not necessarily increasing bank value, in particular not in all market states. Even though the market in the short-run should perceive the appointment of a CRO to the executive board positively, the attitude might change over time if the CRO is powerful enough to be rigid during economic upturns. Before the 2007/2008 credit crisis banks had extremely high returns on equity of around 30%. In order to further increase profits and to satisfy shareholders, more risks had to be taken. In addition liquidity seemed endless. 11 At this point in time, a CRO should both recognize the tremendous risks and be able to induce the necessary reduction in risk exposure and concentrations. However, doing so may result in shareholders getting relatively lower returns compared to their peers in the industry with Risk committee has a value of zero, have either no committee in charge of risk management at all or the audit committee assumes responsibility. We would expect that having a risk committee in general indicates a stronger risk management and therefore better corporate governance. However, as for other board committees, the structure of the committee, the independence of the directors in the committee may matter as well -or even more. Therefore, we collect additional information on the risk committee for a reduced sample as explained below.
The third governance variable is board size, measured as the natural logarithm of the number of directors on a bank"s board (Ln(Board size)). Yermack (1996) finds a negative relation between board size and firm value as measured by Tobin"s Q. Adams and Mehran (2003) find that bank holding companies have on average larger boards of directors than manufacturing firms. They notice that these differences could be explained by regulatory differences as the regulatory requirements imposed on banks may act as substitutes for a sound corporate governance structure. Consequently, board size may be a less important corporate governance characteristic for banks as compared to non-banks.
In fact, Beltratti and Stulz (2010) , using conventional indicators of good governance, even find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed worse during the crisis. The fourth variable we collect data on is board independence as measured by the percentage of independent outside directors on the board of directors (Board independence). We define independent directors as directors without any relation with the company except for their board seat. Hence, we classify directors with prior executive function, with a family relationship with an executive officer of the bank, or with any other business ties, such as for example lawyers or consultants doing other work for the bank as non-independent (or "gray") directors. For non-banks, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black (2002) find no significant relation between the percentage of outside directors and firm value (for a review of the literature, see Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) . Adams (2009) shows that banks with more independent board members even received relatively more money from the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), which
indicates that banks with a higher share of independent board members performed worse during the crisis. This finding is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2010) .
The fifth variable is the percentage of directors with experience (present or past) as an executive officer in a bank or insurance company (% directors w. finance background). 12 Recent corporate accounting scandals have led regulators to stress the importance of having financial experts on the board of directors. As stated in the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, a financial expert has among other things "an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and financial statements". 13 Implicitly the assumption is that this understanding will lead to a better board oversight and ultimately serve the shareholders. In fact, Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) find that financial experts significantly affect the finance and investment policies of (non-bank) firms on whose board they serve. They categorize outside directors into eight categories and find that the appointment of a commercial banker reduces the sensitivity of investment to cash flow as they extend large loans, particularly through their own bank. However, financially restricted firms do not benefit from such practices and financing is only increased for firms with a good credit and financial standing, but poor investment opportunities. Hence, banker directors seem to act in the interest of creditors. Moreover, the appointment of investment bankers to a board of directors is associated with larger debt issues and worse acquisitions.
We augment this set of five hand-collected corporate governance variables by nine additional governance variables from commercial databases. The first variable, which we obtain from the IRRC Governance Legacy database, is the widely-used corporate governance index, or G-Index, of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) . The G-Index comprises 24 corporate governance provisions related to the companies" anti-takeover protection.
The 24 governance attributes are coded in a way that a value of one indicates a stronger 12 In unreported robustness tests, we use a broader definition of finance background. Specifically, we also classify CPAs, CFAs, mutual fund, hedge fund, or private equity fund managers, REIT managers or professors in finance, economics, or accounting as directors with finance background. However, the results remain virtually unchanged and therefore are not reported in any tables. 13 See Section 407 "Disclosure of Audit Committee Financial Expert" of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
anti-takeover protection (and therefore lower shareholder rights) and a value of zero indicates more exposure to the market for corporate control (and therefore better shareholder rights). As the index is simply the sum of the 24 attributes, lower index values indicate stronger shareholder rights and vice versa. In unreported robustness tests, we use a reduced version of the G-Index as proposed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) . This index, usually termed "E-Index", includes only those six provisions which have been shown to be mainly responsible for the negative relation between the G-Index and firm value.
14 We collect six variables related to the board of directors from the IRRC Directors Legacy database. The first variable is a dummy variable whether CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors. Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1993) argue that agency costs in large organizations can be reduced by separating decision management from decision control, and that the board of directors is only an effective device for decision control if it limits the decision discretion of top managers. However, the majority of empirical studies find no significant difference in valuation between firms with separated and firms with combined CEO/chairman positions (e.g., Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell, 1997; Dahya and Travlos, 2000; Schmid and Zimmermann, 2008) . Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) conclude that the costs associated with a breakup of a combined position are larger than the benefits for the majority of firms. The second variable is defined as the fraction of the board which predates the appointment of the CEO (% of directors joining board before CEO). These directors are presumably more independent from the CEO and more likely (and willing) to provide monitoring tasks and enforce unpopular decisions such as for example a CEO turnover. The next variable is the fraction of directors on the board that is older than 72 (% of directors older than 72). Often it is argued that in weakly governed firms with no effective process for evaluating individual directors, old incumbent directors may be allowed to stay on a board as long as they wish. we collect data on two variables related to the line of reporting and therefore power of the CRO within the banks: A dummy variable whether the CRO reports directly to the board of directors (CRO reports to board) and a dummy variable whether the CRO reports to the CEO (CRO reports to CEO). We expect that a CRO has more power if he reports directly to the board of directors as the CEO (or CFO) might be mainly interested in maximizing the growth of sales, assets, and profits as this helps to maximize the value of the personal remuneration package as well as his prestige and power (e.g., managerial empire building). Moreover, if the CEO gets a significant part of his compensation in restricted stock options, the value of his option holdings increases with increasing volatility. Hence, the CEO may actually profit from more bank risk. use the market-to-book ratio (Market-to-book ratio). The third variable is bank size (Ln(assets)), measured as the log of total assets. The fourth variable is the ratio of tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted assets (Tier1 capital ratio) which, from a regulator"s point of view, is a core measure of a bank"s financial strength. Everything else equal, we would expect banks" performance during the crisis to be positively related to Tier1 capital ratio before the crisis since a bank with more capital would suffer less from the debt overhang problem (Myers, 1977) and would have more flexibility to respond to adverse shocks.
The next variable we include is the ratio of deposits to total assets (Deposits/assets). As deposit financing is not subject to runs with deposit insurance, but money market funding is subject to runs (e.g., Gorton, 2010), we would expect that banks with more deposit financing perform better during the crisis. We use the ratio of loans to total assets (Loans/assets) to characterize the asset side of banks. Specifically, banks with higher values of Loans/assets are banks with a smaller portfolio of securities. If banks that held fewer loans had more credit-risky securities, we would expect these banks to have performed worse because of the increase in credit spreads that took place during the crisis. In contrast, banks that held government securities instead of loans would presumably have performed better (e.g., Beltratti and Stulz, 2010) . Hence, the expected relation between Loans/assets and bank performance is unclear.
Finally, Laeven and Levine (2007) and Schmid and Walter (2009) show that a functional diversification of financial institutions is negatively associated with firm value. As diversification may be related to both firm value and corporate governance (see Hoechle, Schmid, Walter, and Yermack, 2010) , we additionally control for the banks" diversification activities. Our measure of the diversity of a bank"s business is based on Laeven and Levine (2007) 18 In unreported robustness tests, we additionally use a number of additional control variables such as for example the natural logarithm of bank age and leverage defined as total debt (calculated as total assets minus the book value of equity) divided by total assets. While the former is never estimated to be significant in the multivariate analyses, the coefficient on leverage is always negative and sometimes significant indicating a negative relation between leverage in 2006 and stock returns during the credit crisis. (25.00%) of the mean (median) bank in our sample is owned by large blockholders with an ownership stake of 5% or more.
Empirical Analysis
Descriptive statistics
The descriptive statistics on the smaller sample of 85 banks in Panel B reveal that the performance of these relatively larger banks was better during the crisis as compared to the return figures in Panel A, with a mean (median) return of -26.03% (-27.19%). Similarly, mean and median crisis ROA and ROE are also somewhat higher for the sample in Panel B. Consistent with the previous discussion, the percentage of banks with a CRO in the executive board is substantially higher in this sample of larger banks (36.47% -or 31 banks). Moreover, the percentage of banks with a dedicated risk committee is substantially higher, 23.53% as compared to 8.06%, and board size is substantially larger with a mean (median) number of directors on the board of 12.89 (13.00). In contrast, the percentage of independent outside directors and directors with finance background on the board is similar between the two samples. For the firms with a risk committee, the average number of meetings of the risk committee is 4.14 times a year, the mean percentage of independent outside directors in the risk committee is 56.44%, and the average number of directors in the risk committee is 2.82. Of the 85 banks, seven banks (8.24%) have a CRO who reports directly to the board of directors. Six banks (7.06%) have a CRO who reports to the CEO. The mean (median) value of the G-Index is 9.67 (10.00). indicating that a majority of outside directors holds three or more directorships. Consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2010) , we find a negative and significant coefficient on the lagged buy-and-hold returns in Column 1. This finding is also consistent with the notion that banks that suffered the most from the crisis appeared to have policies that the market favored before the crisis. However, this result does not hold in our smaller samples in Columns 2 to 6. Also Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find no significant relation between the banks stock returns in the crisis and pre-crisis returns. The coefficient on the market-to-book ratio is always positive and significant in the first three specifications. This finding is consistent with Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) , reporting a negative relation between the book-to-market ratio and crisis returns. Table 3 show that banks, in which the CRO reports directly to the board of directors, perform significantly better during the credit crisis than other banks. This result supports our initial hypothesis that risk governance in general and the line of reporting of the CRO in particular are important to the banks" crisis performance. Our empirical results support the many qualitative statements about the importance of an effective reporting line from the CRO to the board of directors (e.g., Mongiardino and Plath, 2010; Sabato, 2010) . In contrast, banks in which the CRO reports to the CEO perform significantly worse, which is congruent with our hypothesis that the CEO may have a different agenda than the CRO, thus neglecting the importance of risk and emphasizing the growth of assets without a defined risk appetite strategy. The results with respect to all other corporate governance (and financial control) variables remain qualitatively unchanged.
Multivariate analysis
In Table 4 , we replace Buy-and-hold returns as dependent variable by ROA (Columns 1 to 3) and ROE (Columns 4 to 6). As the results remain qualitatively similar as in Tables and 2 and 3 , we only report the results for the specifications in Columns 1, 2, and 5 of Table 3 . These specifications include the original five hand-collected governance 21 The respective values in Beltratti and Stulz (2010) are 55.82% and 58.71%.
variables included in Table 2 , Institutional shareholdings, the five additional handcollected governance variables related to the banks" risk management as included in Table 3 , the G-Index (in Columns 2 and 5), and Ln(USD CEO ownership) (in Columns 3 and 6). The coefficients on the six board characteristics from RiskMetrics are never estimated to be significant and further reduce sample size while the reported results remain similar. Therefore, we do not report further specifications including these variables for space reasons. Most importantly, the coefficient on CRO reports to board remains positive and significant and the coefficient on CRO reports to CEO remains negative and significant in all specifications. The coefficient on Risk committee is now negative and significant in all six Columns while both the Nr. of meetings of the risk committee and
Nr. of directors in risk committee are positive and significant in all specifications. Hence, the results in Table 4 confirm the previous finding of Table 3 that just having a risk committee does not necessarily help banks" crisis performance. However, having a more dedicated committee that meets more frequently and is larger seems to positively affect the banks performance in the crisis. An important difference as compared to Tables 2 and   3 is that the coefficients on both Ln(Board size) and Board independence are now insignificant in all specifications. In contrast, the coefficient on Institutional shareholdings remains negative in all and (borderline) significant in four specifications.
There is one important change in the control variables. The coefficient on Income diversity is estimated negative and significant in all specifications. This result is consistent with Laeven and Levine (2007) and Schmid and Walter (2009) who both show that a functional diversification of financial institutions is negatively associated with firm value. However, the finding that diversification is negatively associated with the banks" returns in the credit crisis is surprising as we would expect that this exactly when the benefits diversification are most important. Hence, either diversification is associated with so many cost-driving problems reducing the banks" profitability that even in financial crises the costs of diversification outweigh the benefits and/or the commercial banks and savings institutions in our sample diversified into activity areas that were hit even harder by the crisis. In fact, in unreported tests, we find that a higher value of Income diversity is associated with a larger share of other operating income (fees, commissions, and trading income) as compared to total operating income indicating investment banking activities (the correlation is 0.57 and significant at the 1% level).
We perform a number of robustness tests. First, and as explained in Section 2.2, we use the alpha from a Carhart (1997) 
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the influence of bank-specific corporate governance, and in particular "risk governance" characteristics on the performance of banks during the financial crisis. We complement the risk governance variables, which are hand-collected Most importantly, our results show that banks, in which the CRO reports directly to the board of directors, perform significantly better in the financial crisis while banks in which the CRO reports to the CEO perform significantly worse than other banks in our sample. A possible explanation for this finding may be that the CEOs" main interest is to maximize growth in sales, assets, and profits -possibly both in the shareholders" as well as his own interest as growth helps to maximize the value of the personal remuneration package as well as prestige and power (e.g., managerial empire building). Hence, the assessment and treatment of risk might be a lower priority for a CEO. In other words, the CEO and CRO may have conflicting interests and if one reports to the other, the risk agenda may not receive the appropriate attention.
To overcome this issue, many regulators have recently started to force CEOs and executive boards to focus more on risk management issues. However, we believe that this change can only be effective if it is also reflected in the banks" corporate governance structure, assigning a stronger role to the CRO with the objective to decrease the volatility of losses during negative market conditions. Ultimately, it is a choice between having a more stable and sound financial system or continuing to manage banks as speculative companies where the latter may result in a socialization of losses occurring in crisis periods while the gains accruing in a good market environment are privatized.
In contrast, and consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2010) and Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), we find either no significant or even a negative relation between a bank"s performance during the crisis and standard corporate governance variables such as CEO ownership, board independence, or shareholder rights as proxied by the G-Index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) . This may indicate that banks were pushed by their boards to maximize shareholder wealth before the crisis and took risks that were understood to create wealth but later turned out poorly in the credit crisis.
Our results show that standard governance measures as used in the large body of literature on corporate governance and its valuation effect in non-financial firms may fall short in describing the relevant governance structure of banks, in particular with respect to their crisis performance. Our results highlight the importance of the so-called "risk governance" in banks. Specifically, we conclude that banks, to be better prepared to face the next financial crisis, have to significantly improve the quality and profile of their risk management function, but also embed the appropriate risk governance having CEO and CRO at the same level, ideally both reporting to the board of directors. This, however, may come at the cost of a lower performance in a normal (i.e., non-crisis) market environment. Institutional shareholdings is the percentage of a bank"s shares owned by large shareholders with ownership stakes of ≥ 5%. Market-to-book ratio is the market value of equity divided by book value of equity, Tier 1 capital ratio is the ratio of tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted assets, Deposits/assets is the ratio of deposits to total assets, and Loans/assets is the ratio of loans to total assets. Panel B additionally includes the following variables: Nr. of meetings of the risk committee is the number of times the risk committee of the respective banks met in 2006. % of independent directors in risk committee is the percentage of independent directors in the risk committee. Note that the three variables related to the risk committee are reported for the 22 banks in the smaller sample which do have a risk committee. The variables in all other banks are set equal to zero. CRO reports to board and CRO reports to CEO, are dummy variables which are equal to one if the CRO directly reports to the board of directors or to the CEO, respectively. G-Index is the governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metric (2003) which comprises 24 anti-takeover provisions. Independent nominating committee is a dummy variable which equals one if the bank"s nominating committee is exclusively comprised of independent directors. Combined CEO/chair is a dummy variable whether CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors. % of directors joining board before CEO is the fraction of the board which predates the appointment of the current CEO. % of directors older than 72 is the fraction of directors on the board that is older than 72. Director non-attendance is defined as the percentage of directors who attend less than 75% of board meetings. Busy board is a dummy variable whether a majority of outside directors holds three or more directorships. USD CEO ownership is the dollar value of all equity and option holdings of the CEO. 
